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I. INTRODUCTION

In our discussion of the media and national security,1 we begin with
the First Amendment, not only with its legal doctrines and principles, but
also with the values of the First Amendment and its function in a free and
democratic society. We will first discuss how the First Amendment
protects the media with respect to its disclosure of information
purportedly affecting national security. We will then discuss the process
by which the media voluntarily refuses to publish information on the
ground that the disclosure of the information will seriously harm the
national security. We will finally discuss the relationship between the
government and the media with respect to obtaining information that
may affect the national security.

t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., 1956,
University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. The title of this Article is taken from the title of the panel, "The Media and
National Security," which was a part of the Symposium, "Issues in the War on Terror:
Investigations, the Media and Article III Courts," sponsored by the Wayne Law Review
on November 16, 2006. I moderated the panel. The participants were William Harlow,
the former Chief Spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency, Dana Priest, a Pulitzer
Prize winner and Washington Post Reporter, covering the intelligence community and
national security issues, and Adam Liptak, the National Legal Correspondent for the New
York Times. Much of the material in this article is based on the research that I did in
connection with presiding over this panel. In the course of the article I will refer to
certain points that were made during the panel discussion, but I have made no attempt to
obtain statements or specific information from the participants on the panel.
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II. HOW THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE MEDIA
The media is in the business of expression,2 and when the
government tries to regulate or sanction expression - in the name of
national security or otherwise - the First Amendment stands as a
substantial obstacle to its doing so. The government cannot avoid the
constraints of the First Amendment by the talismanic invocation of
"national security," for there is no "national security" or "state secrets"
exception to the requirements of the First Amendment. This proposition
follows from the Supreme Court's landmark 1971 decision, New York
Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 3 where the
Supreme Court applied the prior restraint doctrine to hold that a court
could not issue an injunction against the publication of the Pentagon
Papers, a classified study detailing the American government's decisionmaking process in Vietnam.4 The government argued that the publication
of this document - highlighting many mistakes in that process - would
seriously impair the ability of the United States to negotiate a peace
settlement with the North Vietnamese government. 5 This argument was
insufficient to justify a prior restraint, since, as Justice Brennan pointed
out, "the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints
of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward
consequences may result." 6 According to Justice Stewart, the only
circumstances in which a prior restraint could be justified would be
where Congress has acted specifically to prevent the disclosure of the
2. However, the fact that the media is in the business of expression does not give it
any First Amendment rights beyond those enjoyed by the public at large. When reporters
assert a right to attend public trials, for example, they are asserting the same right as is
held by the public at large. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
578 (1980) ("[A] trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally - and
representatives of the media - have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.").
3. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) ("The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of the government and inform the
people.").
4. Id. at 714.
5. Id.at 718.
6. Id. at 725-26. Cf Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding the revocation of
a passport of a former C.I.A. agent who wrote a book in which he disclosed secret
intelligence operations and the names of C.I.A. agents for the purpose of obstructing
intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel). In United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), a lower court issued an injunction
against the publication of a magazine article dealing with the development and
production thermonuclear weapons on the ground that publication of the article would
contribute to nuclear proliferation and that would "adversely affect the national security
of the United States." Id. at 995. The government abandoned its case against the
magazine after it was discovered that information similar to that the government sought
to enjoin was available in a government library elsewhere. United States v. Progressive,
Inc., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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information, and where disclosure of the information "will surely result
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people." 7 The test of "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people" represents the test to determine when it is
constitutionally permissible for a court to issue an injunction against the
publication of information allegedly harmful to "national security." 8
An example of a permissible prior restraint under this highly
exacting standard, analogous to the disclosure of troop movements
discussed by Justice Brennan in The Pentagon Papers Case,9 would be
the publication of the names of CIA agents working undercover in
foreign countries, since the disclosure would create a specific threat of
harm to the agents themselves and to the intelligence gathering activities
of the agents by "blowing their cover."' 0 But absent the disclosure of
information having this kind of extremely harmful effect, the First
Amendment precludes the issue of an injunction against the publication
of information on purported "national security" grounds.
I would also submit that the First Amendment would not tolerate
post-publication sanctions against the media based on surmise or
7. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J. concurring). The holding of the
Supreme Court in The Pentagon Papers Case is based on the opinion of Justice Stewart,
joined in by Justice White, since their position represents the narrowest ground of
agreement among the Justices who concurred in the judgment. See Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). The court issued apercuriam opinion to the effect that
the government had not met the heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition
of a prior restraint. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. Justices Black, Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall concurred in the per curiam opinion, with five
Justices writing concurring opinions. Justices Black and Douglas emphasized that the
First Amendment made no exception for national security, and indicated that a prior
restraint would never be justified on national security grounds. Id.at 714-720 (Black, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan agreed with Justices Black and Douglas that no prior
restraint was permissible, except possibly in time of war with respect to the disclosure of
troop movements or the like. Id. at 724-28 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Stewart and
White concurred on narrower grounds, stating that a prior restraint was not permissible in
this case, because Congress had not acted specifically to prevent the disclosure of this
information and because it could not be said that the disclosure of this information "will
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." Id.
at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
8. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. See id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
10. See Haig, 453 U.S. at 281 (upholding the revocation of a passport of a former
C.I.A. agent who wrote a book in which he disclosed secret intelligence operations and
the names of C.I.A. agents for the purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the
recruiting of intelligence personnel); see also Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990. A
lower court issued an injunction against the publication of a magazine article dealing with
the development and production thermonuclear weapons on the ground that publication
of the article would contribute to nuclear proliferation and that would "adversely affect
the national security of the United States." Id. at 995. The government abandoned its case
against the magazine after it was discovered that information similar to that the
government sought to enjoin was available in a government library in New Mexico.
United States v. Progressive, Inc. 486 F. Supp. 5, 7 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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conjecture that disclosure of the particular information would be harmful
to "national security." In my opinion, the government could not
constitutionally impose post-publication sanctions on the disclosure of
information allegedly harmful to "national security" unless it could make
a strong showing that the information was of such a nature that its
disclosure caused "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" to a
particular national security interest. What I am saying here is that the
constitutional permissibility of post-publication sanctions against the
disclosure of information by the media would be subject to the clear and
present danger doctrine, and that in this context, what constitutes a clear
and present danger to national security would be defined by the "direct,
immediate and irreparable damage" standard formulated by Justice
Stewart in The Pentagon Papers Case." Again, an example of a
publication creating such a danger would be the publication of the names
of CIA agents working undercover in foreign countries, since it would
create a specific threat of harm to the agents themselves and to the2
intelligence gathering activities of the agents by "blowing their cover.'
Two other examples may be found in the federal law prohibiting the
disclosure of classified information, specifically the prohibition against
the disclosure of "the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or
cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government,"
and the prohibition against the disclosure of "the design, construction,
use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or
prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign
government for cryptographic or communication intelligence
purposes. 13 These are very narrow prohibitions, and the disclosure of
this kind of information could cause very serious harm to intelligence
gathering activities. 14
However, there is no "state secrets" exception to the requirements of
the First Amendment. That is, the fact that particular information has
been classified as "secret" by the government does not mean that
11. The clear and present danger doctrine has developed primarily in the context of
determining when the government can constitutionally prohibit the advocacy of unlawful
action, such as the violent overthrow of the government. Under the clear and present
danger test, advocacy of unlawful action is constitutionally protected "except where the
advocacy is directed toward inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). See also
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (holding that threats of violence made by
university students during an anti-war demonstration did not reach the point of "likely to
incite or produce [imminent lawless] action"). See generally Robert A. Sedler, The First
Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of the FirstAmendment", 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
457 (1991) (discussing the clear and present danger doctrine).
12. See Haig, 453 U.S. at 280.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 798(a)(l)-(2) (2006).
14. It is difficult to see any responsible reporter seeking to obtain or report
information about governmental codes or cryptographic systems. It would also seem that
there is very little public interest in knowing about this kind of information.
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Congress can prohibit the disclosure of that information. Rather, the
disclosure of classified information can be prohibited only when the
government can make a showing that the disclosure of the particular
classified information would cause "direct, immediate and irreparable
damage" to an identifiable national security interest. 5 Two of the
provisions of the federal law prohibiting the disclosure of classified
information are overly broad. These provisions prohibit:
[Any publication] in any manner prejudicial to the safety or
interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign
government to the detriment of the United States any classified
information . . . concerning the communication intelligence
activities of the United States or any foreign government; or
from
obtained by the processes of communication intelligence
6
the communications of any foreign government.1
The reason that these provisions could not be invoked against the
dissemination of classified information by the media, such as the New
York Times' disclosure of the NSA surveillance program, is that (1)
because these provisions are overly broad, if they were not interpreted as
embodying the clear and present danger test, they would be void on their
face for over-breadth,' 7 and (2) if they were interpreted as embodying
that exacting test, it is very unlikely that any particular publication would
fall within the prohibition. Since two provisions of the law are very
narrow and only prohibit the disclosure of information that no
responsible journalist would want to disclose, and since two others are
overly broad and could not constitutionally be invoked against the kinds
of information that the media in fact would publish, it is not surprising
that we have not seen any prosecutions against the media for a violation
of this law.
The point to be emphasized then is that there is no national security
or state secrets exception to the requirements of the First Amendment
and that, with very limited exceptions, the government cannot prevent or
sanction the disclosure of information by the media on the ground that
the disclosure is harmful to national security.

15. See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 798(a)(3)-(4) (2006).
17. See, e.g., Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447-48.
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III. THE VOLUNTARY REFUSAL OF THE MEDIA TO PUBLISH
INFORMATION HARMFUL TO NATIONAL SECURITY

While the First Amendment strongly protects the right of the media
to publish information against the wishes of the government, the First
Amendment also strongly embodies the principle of editorial discretion8
and the right of the media to decide what they will and will not publish.
Reporters and editors are acting in the best traditions of the First
Amendment and in accordance with their role in advancing the function
of freedom of expression in a democratic and open society if they decide
that particular information should not be published because the
disclosure of that information would seriously harm the public interest in
national security.
"The Media and National Security" Symposium panel discussed
extensively the matter of the media's deciding that particular information
should not be published because the disclosure of that information would
seriously harm the public interest in national security. In this connection,
the panel explored questions such as: How do government officials go
about suggesting to reporters or editors that they not disclose information
on grounds that the disclosure will harm national security? How do
reporters and editors deal with requests to not disclose? And finally, how
do they decide independently that certain information should not be
published for reasons of national security?
Although the panelists presented different perspectives, they agreed
that it was rare for the government to try to persuade the media to refuse
to publish an entire story. Rather, the government's concern was to
prevent the publication of particular information contained in a story. A
typical situation was the government saying to a reporter, "We have a
real problem with this story. Can you take some facts out of the story?"
Facts that the government typically wants to remove from stories are
those relating to location or assistance from foreign governments that
those governments would prefer to keep secret. From the standpoint of
the government official making the request, it is "Trust me on this one."
From the standpoint of the editor (the request not to disclose always goes
to a top editor) it is a matter of trying to accommodate the request by
winnowing down the story to "what is really important."
In an op-ed in the New York Times a few months before the
Symposium, Dean Baquet, editor of The Los Angeles Times, and Bill
Keller, executive editor of The New York Times, set forth an editorial
18. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117121 (1973) (discussing the right of editorial discretion); see also Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (recognizing the right of editorial
discretion); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (also recognizing the
right of editorial discretion).

THE MEDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY

20071

1031

view on how the press balances national security with its mission to
report the news. 19 The authors point out that
In recent years our papers have brought you a great deal of
information the White House never intended for you to know classified secrets about the questionable intelligence that led the
country to war in Iraq, about the abuse of prisoners in Iraq and
Afghanistan, about the transfer of suspects to countries that are
not squeamish about using torture, about eavesdropping without
warrants.2 °
The authors then ask, "[h]ow do we, as editors, reconcile the
obligation to inform with the instinct to protect?" 2 1 They answer that
"sometimes the judgments are easy," such as their reporters in Iraq and
Afghanistan who take great care to conceal operational intelligence in
reports, knowing the possibility that the information could be seen and
used by the enemy.22 However the authors admit that "[o]ften the
judgments are painfully hard." The process, they say, begins with
23
reporting. The reporters work "with sources who may be scared, who
may know only part of the story, who may have their own agendas that
need to be discovered and taken into account." "We double check and
triple check. We seek out sources with different points of view. We
challenge our sources when contradictory information emerges. 24
The next step is hearing the government's case. Baquet and Keller
say that "no article on a classified program gets published until the
25
responsible officials have been given a fair opportunity to comment.,
More significantly, they point out that if "the [responsible officials] want
to argue that publication represents a danger to national security, we put
things on hold and give them a respectful hearing. 26 Often the reporters
agree to participate in off-the-record conversations with officials, so that
they can make their case without fear of spilling more secrets onto our
front pages.27
19. Dean Baquet & Bill Keller, When Do We Publish a Secret?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1,
2006, at A15.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.

25. Baquet & Keller, supra note 19.

26. Id
27. Baquet and Keller say that in the last few years each of them has had the
experience of withholding or delaying an article when the administration convinced them
that the risk of publication outweighed the benefits. The New York Times withheld the
article "on telephone eavesdropping for more than a year, until editors felt that further
reporting had whittled away the administration's case for secrecy." Id.The New York
Times says that it did not publish articles that "might have jeopardized efforts to protect
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But in the final analysis, the reporters make the decisions:
We understand that honorable people may disagree with any of
these choices - to publish or not to publish. But making those
decisions is the responsibility that falls to editors, a corollary to
the great gift of our independence. It is not a responsibility we
take lightly. And it is not one that we can surrender to the
government.28
There is a different view about the responsibility of the media with
respect to government secrets in what a proponent of that view, Gabriel
Schoenfeld, the senior editor of Commentary, has called "the life-anddeath area of national security., 29 Mr. Schoenfeld takes as his starting
point the New York Times' disclosure of the National Security Agency's
domestic surveillance program, and maintains that "there is a wellfounded principle that newspapers do not carry a shield that
automatically allows them to publish whatever they wish. 30 He further
contends that, "the press can and should be held to account for
publishing military secrets in wartime." 3' However, as Mr. Schoenfeld
notes, "it is hardly surprising that, over the decades, successful
prosecution of the recipients and purveyors of leaked secret government
information has been as rare as leaks of such information have become
abundant., 32 But, legality aside, Mr. Schoenfeld raises the question of
"whether, in the aftermath of September 11, we as a nation can afford to
permit the reporters and editors of a great newspaper to become the
unelected authority that determines for us all what is a legitimate secret
and what is not.",33 Carried to its logical conclusion, Mr. Schoenfeld's
vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material, and articles about highly sensitive
counterterrorism initiatives that are still in operation." Id.The Los Angeles Times said
that it "withheld information about American espionage and surveillance activities in
Afghanistan discovered on computer drives purchased by reporters in an Afghan bazaar."
Id. They said that sometimes they dealt "with the security concerns by editing out
gratuitous detail that lends little to public understanding but might be useful to the targets
of surveillance." Id.An example of this situation was the Washington Post's agreeing, at
the administration's request, not to name the specific countries that had secret Central
Intelligence Agency prisons. Baquet & Keller, supra note 19.
28. Id.
29. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the "New York Times" Violated the Espionage Act?,
COMMENT. MAG., Mar. 2006, at 23.
30. Id.at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 24. As we have discussed previously, the disclosure of information that the
government wishes to keep secret on "national security" grounds can only be prohibited
where the government makes a strong showing that the disclosure of the information
would cause "direct, immediate and irreparable damage" to a particular national security
interest. The disclosure of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program
could hardly meet this very exacting test and so is constitutionally protected.
33. Id.at 31.
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position is that, again apart from the legalities, and apart from the matter
of defining what is a "military secret," the media should not be
publishing military secrets in wartime.
Obviously, the media disagrees with that position, and as we have
seen, they frequently publish what Mr. Schoenfeld calls "government
secrets in wartime. 34 For better or worse, this is how it works in the
American constitutional system. Regardless of the outcome, because of
the strength of the First Amendment in the American constitutional
system, 35 only the media can decide whether to publish "government
secrets in wartime." If the media's publication of "government secrets in
wartime" somehow impedes the government in its "war on terrorism,"
this is the price that we have chosen to pay for living under a
constitutional system in which the value of freedom of expression takes
precedence over other values, including the value of national security.
The positive side of the equation is that the government cannot operate in
secret, that its actions are subject to public scrutiny and criticism, and
that the pressure of public opinion, sometimes manifested in
Congressional action, may force a change in government policy. For
example, in the wake of public criticism following the media disclosure
of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program, the
Bush Administration announced that in the future, it would seek warrants
for such surveillance from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.36
In addition, Congress made legislative changes that actually expanded
the authority of the government to seek warrants for such surveillance.37
The public debate over surveillance of communications directed toward
American citizens - and indeed the public debate over all governmental
activities in the "war on terrorism" - is the result of the media's relentless
disclosure of those activities and is in the best traditions of the First
Amendment.

34. Id. at 24.
35. As to the strength of the First Amendment in the American Constitutional System,
see Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest
of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 377 (2006).
36. Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at Al.
37. The law embodying these changes, however, was only effective for six months.
See Scott Shane, Senate Panel to See Paperson Agency's Eavesdropping,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2007, at A18. Congress is now considering reauthorizing the law, and in
connection with the debate over reauthorization, the White House has agreed to share
secret document of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program with
the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id.
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA
WITH RESPECT TO OBTAINING INFORMATION THAT MAY AFFECT
NATIONAL SECURITY

We now turn to the matter of the media seeking to obtain
information from the government and conversely of the government
seeking to obtain information from the media. In this regard, one of the
points made during the panel discussion was that the media and the
government are not always engaged in an adversary relationship, with
the media wanting to publish information and the government wanting to
keep the information secret.38 Sometimes government officials, in order
to advance the government's purpose, voluntarily disclose information to
the media, so that the media will assist them in conveying the
government's message to the public. 39 Often the information is disclosed
surreptitiously, without identifying the governmental source, so that it is
best described as an "authorized leak." 40 At these times, the governmentmedia relationship can become very symbiotic, and the media's
publication of the information that the government wants to convey to
the public clearly serves the public information function of the First
Amendment.
The government-media relationship becomes adversarial when the
media obtains "unauthorized disclosures leaks" from officials inside the
government. Officials inside the government are sworn to secrecy, and
they cannot successfully assert a First Amendment right to violate their
oath of secrecy. 4 ' Still, prosecutions against government officials for
unauthorized disclosures of information are fairly rare, usually because it
is not possible to identify the source of the "leak. 4 2 In any event, the fact
that the media obtained the information through an unauthorized "leak"
from a government official, as in The Pentagon Papers case, has no effect
whatsoever on the media's First Amendment right to publish the
38. Robert A. Sedler, The Media and National Security Panel at the Wayne Law
Review Symposium: Issues in the War on Terror: Investigations, the Media, and Article
III Courts (Nov. 16, 2006).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. Morison is an example of a successful prosecution against a government
employee for unauthorized disclosure of classified information. 1d. Morison was
employed at the Naval Intelligence Support Center and had a Top Secret Security
clearance. Id. at 1060. In connection with his security clearance, he had signed a nondisclosure agreement. Id. He had also been doing off-duty work for Jane's Fighting
Ships, an English publication that provided current information on naval operations
internationally. See id. He took certain satellite secured photographs of a Soviet aircraft
carrier under construction in a Black Sea naval shipyard and sent them to Jane's.
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1061. He was convicted for a violation of the Espionage Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 641, 793(d), (e), for transmitting the secret documents to "one not entitled to
receive them." Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060. The court summarily rejected his claim that
the First Amendment protected the transmittal. Id. at 1068.
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information.43 The panel discussed the matter of unauthorized "leaks"
and the reasons why a government official would "leak" information to
the media. These reasons were sometimes personal. 44 For example, the
government official felt important because he or she was approached for
information by the media or the official had a good working relationship
with the reporter and wished to help the reporter with a story.4 5
Sometimes the reasons were in the broad sense political, such as that
there had been bureaucratic infighting, and the official disclosed the
information in order to advance that official's position, or that the official
believed that the government was doing something very wrong, and
wanted to disclose the information
in order to advance what the official
' 6
believed was the "public interest. "
Apart from unauthorized "leaks" by disaffected government
officials, the media has no way of obtaining information from the
government that the government does not wish to disclose. 47 Courts have
long established that there is no First Amendment right of access to
information possessed by the government or sources of information
within the government's control.48 This means that as a constitutional
matter, the government may refuse to release information within its
control and may deny access to governmental facilities in which
governmental functions and operations are taking place.49 While
Congress has enacted the Freedom of Information Act, 50 in order to
provide broad public access to information within the control of the
executive branch, the Act specifically exempts from disclosure national
defense or foreign policy information properly classified pursuant to an
executive order issued by or under the authority of the President.5' The
current executive order exempts information pertaining to military plans,
weapons or operations, information pertaining to the vulnerabilities of
43. See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516 (2001) (holding that the federal
wiretap law, prohibiting the illegal interception of telephone communications, could not
constitutionally be applied to impose liability against a newspaper for broadcasting an
illegally intercepted communication concerning a matter of public interest,
notwithstanding that the newspaper had reason to know that the communication had been
illegally intercepted).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978) (noting that since the media
has no greater First Amendment rights than are enjoyed by the public at large, the media
likewise cannot claim a constitutional right of access to government-controlled
information).
49. It is for this reason that the government may restrict media access to military
operations, such as those taking place in Iraq, and may limit access to media persons
"embedded" with military units or otherwise receiving military approval for their
reporting activities.

50. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006).
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national security systems, installations, plans or projects, information
pertaining to foreign governments and foreign relations, information
about scientific, technological or economic matters that relate to national
security, information pertaining to programs for safeguarding nuclear
materials or facilities, cryptology information, confidential source
information, and other categories of national security information
ordered classified by the President. 52 With so much governmental
information foreclosed to the media, it is easy to understand why the
media may try to obtain information from unauthorized "leaks" by
government officials.
On the other hand, the First Amendment does not preclude the
government from obtaining information from members of the media if
the government is entitled to obtain the same kind of information from
the public at large. Again, it must be emphasized that the media have no
First Amendment rights beyond those enjoyed by the public at large.
Thus, a reporter may constitutionally be compelled to testify before a
grand jury and to reveal information obtained from confidential sources
in the process. 5 3 Similarly, the government may search newspaper offices
with a properly obtained
search warrant and is not required to proceed by
4
way of subpoena.1
The matter of the media and national security in relation to the
government's power to obtain information from members of the media
recently surfaced in the case of New York Times investigative reporter
Judith Miller. The facts of this case are as follows. 55 In President Bush's
State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, the President stated
that: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." There was an
ensuing public controversy over the accuracy of the proposition that
Saddam Hussein had sought uranium, a key ingredient in the
development of nuclear weaponry, from Africa. 56 On July 6, 2003, the
New York Times printed an op-ed article written by former Ambassador
Joseph Wilson.57 In the article, Wilson claimed that the Central
Intelligence Agency sent him to Niger in 2002 in response to inquiries
from Vice President Cheney to investigate whether Iraq had been seeking
to purchase uranium from Niger.58 Wilson further claimed that he had

52. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (July 3, 1978).
53. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685-86 (1972).
54. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558-60 (1978).
55. The facts are taken from the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in In re GrandJury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
56. Id. at 965-66.
57. Id. at 966.

58. Id.
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conducted the requested investigation and reported that there was no
credible evidence that any such effort had been made. 59
On July 14, 2003, columnist Robert Novak wrote an article that
appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times. 60 In his column, he asserted that the
decision to send Wilson to Niger had been made "routinely without
Director George Tenet's knowledge," and that "two senior
administration officials" told him that Wilson's selection was at the
suggestion of Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, whom Novak described as a
CIA "operative on weapons of mass destruction.",6 ' After the Chicago
Sun-Times published Novak's column, various media accounts reported
government officials had told other reporters that Wilson's wife worked
she was
at the CIA monitoring weapons of mass destruction, and that
62
involved in her husband's selection for the mission to Niger.
For government officials to tell the media that Valerie Plame worked
for the CIA could be a violation of a federal law prohibiting the
unauthorized disclosure of the identity of a federal agent.63 A special
prosecutor was appointed to conduct an investigation into whether
government employees had violated this law. 64 The special prosecutor
convened a grand jury to investigate the matter, and the grand jury issued
subpoenas to Judith Miller, seeking documents and testimony relating to
conversations between her and a specified government official on certain
dates concerning Valerie Plame or concerning Iraqi efforts to obtain the
refused to comply with the subpoena and the court held
uranium. 65 Miller rfs
66
her in contempt. The court rejected her claim of First Amendment
privilege, in accordance with applicable Supreme Court precedent.6 7 She
was also confined, until claiming that she had been released from secrecy

59. Id.
60. Id. at 966.
61. Miller, 397 F.3d at 966 (citing Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUNTIMEs, July 14, 2003, at 31).
62. Id.One such reporter was Matthew Cooper, whose article on this matter appeared
in Time magazine. Id. An August 2, 2004 subpoena to Time requested "all notes, tape
recordings, e-mails, or other documents of Matthew Cooper relating to the July 17, 2003
Time.com article entitled 'A War on Wilson?' and the July 21, 2003 Time Magazine
article entitled, 'A Question of Trust."' Id.Cooper and Time moved to quash the
subpoenas. Id. at 967. However, on October 7, 2004, the District Court denied the
motion. Id.They also refused to comply with the subpoenas. Miller, 397 F.3d at 967.
Accordingly, on October 13, 2004, the District Court held that their refusal was without
just cause and held both in contempt. Cooper and Time subsequently complied with the
subpoena. Id.
63. 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2006).
64. Miller, 397 F.3d at 966.
65. Id.at 967.
66. Id.
67. Id.at 968-72.
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by the source
of her information, she agreed to comply with the
68
subpoena.
The Judith Miller case brought attention to the fact that there is no
federal reporters' shield law, enabling journalists to refuse to reveal
confidential sources. Some 33 states and the District of Columbia have
such laws, and a bill to establish a federal shield law is now pending in
Congress. 69 But in the absence of such a law, the federal government and
federal prosecutors can require reporters to disclose information obtained
from confidential sources. 70 To this extent, the government has a weapon
against the media that the media does not have against the government.
V. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have discussed the media and national security
from the perspective of the First Amendment, not only with its legal
doctrines and principles, but also with the values of the First Amendment
and its function in a free and democratic society. We have first discussed
how the First Amendment protects the media with respect to its
disclosure of information purportedly affecting national security. We
have emphasized that there is no national security or state secrets
exception to the requirements of the First Amendment, and have
concluded that with very limited exceptions, the government cannot
prevent or sanction the disclosure of information by the media on the
ground that the disclosure is harmful to national security.
We have then discussed the process by which the media voluntarily
refuses to publish information on the ground that the disclosure of the
information will seriously harm the national security. The discussion
points out that the media takes very seriously governmental requests that
it avoid disclosing particular information that the government wants to
68. David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times ReporterFree From Jail; She Will Testify,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
69. See Kathy Kiely, Measure to Shield Reporters' Secret Sources Likely to Pass,
USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 2007, at 5A.
70. See Miller, 397 F.3d at 975. The Justice Department has promulgated guidelines
for the issuance of subpoenas for testimony by the news media. Id. These guidelines
require that Attorney General must approve the subpoena. Id. They require that the
information sought by the subpoena must be "essential to a successful investigation,
particularly with reference to establishing guilt or innocence," that before issuing the
subpoena, "all reasonable efforts should be made to obtain the desired information from
alternative sources," and that when the issuance of a subpoena to a member of the media
is contemplated, the government should "pursue negotiations with the relevant media
organization." Id. The guidelines do not create a legally enforceable right. Id. The
Department of Justice maintains that the Department issues subpoenas to journalists
"very rarely," having sought subpoenas for reporters' confidential sources only 19 times
since 1991. See Kiely, supra note 69, at 5A. However, the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press says that special prosecutors and attorneys for private clients seek
the most subpoenas, and that at least 40 reporters have been subpoenaed to turn over
confidential information in the past three years. See id.
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keep secret on national security grounds, but in the end the media not
infrequently decides to publish the information. While the disclosure of
such information may be seen as sometimes impeding the government in
its "war on terrorism," the positive side of the equation is that the
disclosure of this information means that the government's actions are
subject to public scrutiny and criticism and that the pressure of public
opinion may force a change in governmental policy. Finally, we have
discussed the sometimes symbiotic and sometimes adversarial
relationship between the media and the government with respect to
obtaining information from each other that may affect the national
security.
In the final analysis, we live under the First Amendment, and the
doctrines and values of the First Amendment govern the media and
national security in American society.

